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ABSTRACT 
What is the Internet like, and how do we know? Less 
tendentiously, how can we make general statements about 
the Internet without reference to alternatives that help us to 
understand what the space of network design possibilities 
might be? This paper presents a series of cases of network 
alternatives which provide a vantage point from which to 
reflect upon the ways that the Internet does or does not 
uphold both its own design goals and our collective 
imaginings of what it does and how. The goal is to provide 
a framework for understanding how technologies embody 
promises, and how these both come to evolve. 
Author Keywords 
Network protocols; network topology; naming routing; 
media infrastructures. 
ACM Classification Keywords 
H.5.m. Information interfaces and presentation (e.g., HCI): 
Miscellaneous.  
INTRODUCTION 
What does it mean to say, as many have, that “the Internet 
treats censorship as damage and routes around it” [14]? Or 
what does it mean to argue, as is also common, that the 
Internet is a democratizing force as a result of its 
decentralized architecture [8]? Or that it’s a platform for 
grass-roots community-building rather than mass media 
messaging [35]?  
Statements like these have been critiqued for their treatment 
of topics such as democracy, censorship, broadcasting, or 
community – all complicated terms that are perhaps 
invoked and conjured more than they are critically 
examined [19]. However, the term that I want to focus on in 
these statements is “the Internet”. When we attribute 
characteristics to the Internet, specifically, what do we 
mean? Do we just mean “digital networks”? Do we mean 
digital networks that implement the Internet protocols? Or 
do we mean the one very specific network that we have 
built – the Internet, this Internet, our Internet, the one to 
which I’m connected right now? 
I ask these questions in the context of a burgeoning recent 
interest in examining digital technologies as materially, 
socially, historically and geographically specific [e.g. 13, 
15, 36, 37]. There is no denying the central role that “the 
digital,” broadly construed, plays as part of contemporary 
everyday life. Wireless connectivity, broadband 
communications, and computational devices may be 
concentrated in the urban centers of economically 
privileged nations, but even in the most “remote” corners of 
the globe, much of everyday life is structured, organized, 
and governed by databases and algorithms, and “the digital” 
still operates even in the central fact of its occasional 
absence, the gap that renders particular spots “off grid.” 
Where digital technologies were once objects of primarily 
engineering attention, their pervasive presence has meant 
that other disciplines – anthropology, political science, 
communication, sociology, history, cultural studies, and 
more – have had to grapple with the question, “what are the 
cultural consequences of ‘the digital’?” The problem, 
however, has been to get a grip up on what ‘the digital’ 
itself is. Rather too often, ‘the digital’ is taken simply as a 
metaphor for regimentation and control, or it is used to 
name some amorphous and unexamined constellation of 
representational and computational practices. The 
somewhat casual assertion that “the Internet” has some 
particular properties runs this danger. It’s difficult to know 
how to read or assess these assertions without, for example, 
understanding something of the scope of what is being 
claimed through some kind of differential analysis of “the 
not-Internet.” We need to take an approach to “the Internet” 
that begins with an understanding of its technical reality, 
although not one that reduces it to simply that. In other 
words, we want to maintain a focus on the social and 
cultural reality of technologies such as Internet, but in a 
way that takes seriously its material specificities. 
Two Transitions 
To make this argument more concrete, let me begin by 
describing two cases from my own working history, two 
digital transitions that illustrate the complexity of talking 
about the Internet as a force for decentralization. 
The first of these transitions occurred in the early 1990s 
when I worked for Xerox. Xerox had been a pioneer in 
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digital networking. Early research on Ethernet and 
distributed systems constituted an important precursor to 
the development of the Internet Protocol (IP) suite, and the 
research systems such as PUP [4] and Grapevine [3] had 
subsequently given rise to a protocol suite called XNS 
(Xerox Network Services), which was the basis of a line of 
digital office systems products that Xerox sold in the 
marketplace. Xerox’s own corporate network spanned the 
globe, linking thousands of workstations and servers 
together using the XNS protocols. In the 1990s, as Unix 
workstations began to dominate the professional 
workstation market, and as the arrival of distributed 
information services such as Gopher, WAIS, and WWW 
spurred the accelerated growth of the Internet, many inside 
Xerox became interested in using TCP/IP on internal 
networks too. Particular at research and development 
centers, various groups began to run TCP/IP networks 
locally and then increasingly looked for ways to connect 
them together using the same leased lines that carried XNS 
traffic between sites. What began as renegade or illicit 
actions slowly became organizationally known and 
tolerated, and then organizationally supported as TCP/IP 
became a recognized aspect of internal corporate 
networking within Xerox. 
XNS was a protocol suite designed for corporate 
environments. Although technically decentralized, it 
depended on an administratively centralized or managed 
model. The effective use of XNS was tied together by a 
distributed database service known as the Clearinghouse, 
which was responsible for device naming, address 
resolution, user authentication, access control, and related 
functions. Users, servers, workstations, printers, email lists, 
organizational units, and other network-relevant objects 
were all registered in the Clearinghouse, which was 
implemented as a distributed network of database servers 
linked via a so-called “epidemic” algorithm by which they 
would keep their database records up to date. Access 
control mechanisms distinguished administrators, who 
could update Clearinghouse databases, from regular users, 
who could look up names but couldn’t introduce new ones. 
The Clearinghouse service was central enough to the 
operation of XNS services that this administrative access 
was needed for all sorts of operations, from adding new 
users to installing new workstations. 
By contrast, the TCP/IP network, and the Unix workstations 
that it generally linked, was much less centrally 
administered. For the Unix machines, users could be 
defined locally for each computer, and similarly, 
workstations could maintain their own machine addressing 
and network routing information. Even when systems were 
interconnected, much less coordination was required to get 
machines connected together effectiveness in the IP 
network than in the XNS network. As a result, the rise of 
the IP network provided a route by which people could to 
some extent become more independent of the corporate IT 
management structure through which the XNS network was 
operated. Since XNS was the dominant technology for 
organizational communication, it wasn’t entirely possible 
for people using TCP/IP to “route around” the corporate 
network, but it started to provide some independence. 
The second transition was also a transition to IP, but in a 
very different context. This transition was going on while I 
briefly worked at Apple in the late 1990s. As at Xerox, the 
rise of the Internet in general was reflected in the increasing 
use of TCP/IP in a network that had originally been put 
together through a different network protocol – in this case, 
AppleTalk. AppleTalk was a proprietary network suite that 
Apple developed to connect Macintosh computers; it had 
evolved over time to operate over the Ethernet networks 
commonly deployed in corporate settings, although it had 
originally been developed for linking computers together in 
relatively small networks. One important feature of the 
Appletalk networking protocols is their so-called “plug-
and-play” approach, which allows a network to be deployed 
with minimal manual configuration. For example, 
Appletalk does not require that network addresses be pre-
assigned or that a server be available for network resource 
discovery; these features are managed directly by the 
networked computers themselves. Accordingly, setting up 
Appletalk networks requires little or no administrative 
intervention. TCP/IP networks, on the other hand, do 
require some services to be set up – DHCP servers to 
allocate addresses, name servers to resolve network 
addresses, and so on. (In fact, the contemporary networking 
technologies known as Bonjour or Zeroconf are 
mechanisms designed to re-introduce Appletalk’s plug-and-
play functionality into TCP/IP networking.) So, where the 
transition from XNS to TCP/IP was a decentralizing 
transition at Xerox, one that increased people’s 
independence from corporate network management, the 
transition from Appletalk to TCP/IP at Apple moved in the 
other direction, creating more reliance on network 
infrastructure and hence on network administration. 
These examples illustrate two important concerns that 
animate this paper. The first is that statements about “the 
Internet” and its political and institutional character suffer 
for a lack of contrast classes (“critical alternatives,” if you 
will). The Internet may well be decentralized – but 
compared to what, exactly? More decentralized 
internetworks could be imagined and have existed. We 
might be able to make some more fruitful observations if 
the “Internet” that we are trying to characterize weren’t 
such a singular phenomenon. In this paper I will briefly 
sketch some cases that might serve as points of comparison 
that provide for more specific statements about 
contemporary phenomena by showing how they might be, 
and have been, otherwise. The first concern, then, is to 
provide a framework within which the characterizations can 
take on more meaning. The second concern is that the 
singular nature of the Internet makes it hard for us to 
distinguish the conceptual object of our attention, the object 
that we are characterizing. Given that the Internet – the 
specific Internet to which we can buy or obtain access today 
– is generally the only Internet we have known, it’s hard to 
be able to pin down just what object it is that we are 
characterizing when we talk about, say, decentralization. 
Do we mean that a world-spanning network-of-networks is 
inherently decentralized? Or is decentralization a 
characteristic of the specific protocols and software that we 
might use to operate that network (the Internet protocols)? 
Or is it rather a characteristic of the specific network that 
we have build, which doesn’t just use those protocols, but 
implements them in a specific network made of particular 
connections, an amalgam of undersea fiber-optic cables, 
domestic WiFi connections, commercial service providers, 
and so on? Is it our Internet that’s decentralized, while we 
could still imagine a centralized one being built? Or is our 
Internet actually less decentralized than it might be, failing 
to achieve its own promise (if that’s something we want)? 
In order to provide the resources to think about these 
questions fruitfully, I will approach the topic from two 
perspectives. The first is to briefly catalog some alternatives 
to “the” Internet. Some of these are entirely alternative 
networks; some are small components of the broader 
Internet that do not always operate the same way as the 
whole. The second is to take in turn some key aspects of 
network function – routing, naming, and so on – and 
examine their contemporary specificities, with particular 
focus on the relationship between specific commercial and 
technical arrangements and the openness or range of 
possibilities encapsulated by the network design. Taken 
together, these allow us to develop an understanding of the 
landscape of potential network arrangements within which 
our current arrangements take their place, and perhaps more 
accurately then target or assess statements about what “the 
Internet” is or does. 
A CATALOG OF OTHERNETS 
Our starting point are what I have been calling “othernets” 
– non-Internet internets, if you will. Some of these are 
networks of a similar style but which happen to use 
different protocols; some of them are radically different 
arrangements. Some of them are global networks, and some 
more localized; some are specific networks and some are 
ways of thinking about or approaching network design. The 
collection listed here is far from comprehensive.1 What they 
do for us here, though, is to flesh out an internetworking 
space of possibilities, one that helps to place “the Internet” 
in some context. 
Fidonet 
A Bulletin Board System (BBS) hosts messages and 
discussions, generally on a quite simple technology 
platform such as a conventional home PC with a modem 
that allows people to call into it over regular phone lines to 
                                                           
1 Most problematically, local and community “DIY” networks 
usefully illuminate the issues in question but had to be omitted for 
space [e.g. 1, 16, 21, 30]. 
read and post messages. In the US, where local phone calls 
were generally free, BBSs flourish in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, as the home computer market grew. With very 
simple software, they allowed people to communicate by 
dialing in to the BBS at different times and posting 
messages that others would read later. While one certainly 
could make a long-distance call to connect to a BBS, most 
BBS use was local to take advantage of toll-free calling, so 
that most BBS activity was highly regionalized. 
Fido was the name of BBS software first written by Tom 
Jennings in San Francisco in 1984 and then adopted by 
others elsewhere in the US. Before long, Fido was updated 
with code that would allow different Fido BBS systems to 
call each other to exchange messages; Fidonet is the name 
both of this software and of the network of BBS systems 
that exchanged messages through this mechanism.  
Fidonet’s growth was explosive; from its start in 1985, 
Fidonet had around 500 nodes by the end of 1985, almost 
2,000 by 1987, 12,000 by 1991 and over 35,000 by 1995. 
Each of these nodes was a BBS that server ten to hundreds 
of users, who could exchange email messages, files, and 
discussions on group lists.  
Fidonet’s design was (with one critical exception) radically 
decentralized. Based as it was on a dial-up model rather 
than an infrastructure of fixed connections, it employed a 
model of direct, peer-to-peer communication. The Fidonet 
software was originally designed with a flat list of up to 250 
nodes; system of regions, zones, and networks was 
introduced within a year of the original software when it 
became clear that the system would very soon grow beyond 
that capacity. This structure, which mapped the topology of 
the network geographically, provided a message routing 
structure which reduced costs (by maximizing local calling 
and by pooling messages for long-distance transfer) but 
with a minimum of fixed structure; direct communication 
between nodes was always central to the Fidonet model. 
The structure essentially exhibited a two-level architecture; 
one of conventional structures (that is, the conventional 
pattern of daily or weekly connections between sites) and 
an immediate structure, made up of those nodes 
communicating with each other right now. (The Internet – 
being made up in its current form primarily of fixed 
infrastructure and broadband connectivity – largely 
conflates these two.) 
Within a year, Fidonet was in in danger of hitting an initial 
limit of 250 nodes, and so the network protocols and 
software were redesigned around the concepts of regions 
and nets. Until this point, Fidonet had used a single, “flat” 
list of nodes, which was directly maintained by Jennings. 
The introduction of regions and nets allowed for a more 
decentralized structure. This was simultaneously an 
addressing structure and a routing structure, linked together 
– the structure of the network was also the structure that 
determined how messages would make their way from one 
place to another. 
Fidonet was built around a file transfer mechanism that 
would allow files to move from one node to another. Other 
facilities could be built on top of this mechanism, such as 
electronic mail. One of the major features of Fidonet from 
the user perspective was the discussion groups known as 
“echoes”. Echoes allowed users to post messages that 
would be distributed to all users on the system interested in 
a topic. A “moderation” mechanism allowed echo managers 
to discourage off-topic posts, but this was a post-hoc 
mechanism (rather than an approach which required explicit 
approval before a message was sent out). As in systems 
such as The Well [39], the topically-oriented discussion 
forums provided by echoes were the primary site of 
interaction and community building across Fidonet 
(although unlike The Well, Fido echoes were networked 
rather than centralized.) 
Usenet 
Usenet is a somewhat informal term for a worldwide 
network of computers linked by a series of mechanisms 
built on top of a facility provided by versions of the Unix 
operating system [18]. The facility was known as uucp, 
which stands for “Unix-to-Unix copy.” In Unix’s 
command-line environment, “uucp” was a command that 
users could use to copy files between computers. It was 
designed by analogy with the standard “cp” command for 
copying files; just as a user might use “cp” to copy a file 
from a source to a destination filename, they might also use 
“uucp” to copy a file from a source to a destination, where 
either the source or destination file location was in fact on a 
different computer. 
Uucp was developed as a basic user file-copy facility, but 
the core idea of file-based interconnections between 
minicomputers was general enough that many other 
facilities could be built on top of it. For instance, uucp 
could be used to support email messaging between sites, 
exchanging individual messages as files that the remote 
system would recognize as drafts to be delivered by email 
locally. The same mechanisms that named remote files, 
then, might also be used to name remote users. 
Since it had been designed initially simply to provide a user 
interface to a dial-up mechanism for file exchange, Usenet 
provided no global naming mechanism to identify sites, 
files, objects, or users. Rather, its naming mechanism was a 
sequence of identifiers (separated by exclamation points or 
“bangs”) that explained how a message should be routed. 
So, for instance, the path “seismo!mcvax!ukc!itspna!jpd” 
directs a computer to deliver the file first to a computer  
called “seismo”, at which point the path will be rewritten to 
“mcvax!ukc!itspna!jpd”; subsequently, it will be delivered 
to a computer called “mcvax”, then to one called “ukc,” and 
so on. “jpd” is the user, whose account is on the computer 
“itspna”. To send a message correctly, then, required that 
one knew not only the destination, but the route that the 
message should take – the series of peer-to-peer 
connections that must be made. Each path describes a direct 
connection; our example bang path only works if “mcvax” 
is one of the computers that “seismo” regularly connects to 
directly. One couldn’t, for instance, route a message along 
the path “seismo!ukc!itspna!jpd” because seismo only dials 
up to certain other computers, and ukc isn’t one of them. 
Two aspects of this are worth noting. The first concerns the 
dynamics of network structure in the presence of this route-
based addressing mechanism. Route-based addressing via 
bang paths means not just that you need to understand how 
your computer is connected to the network; everybody 
needs to understand how your computer is connected to the 
network, if they want to reach you, and they need to 
understand how all the intermediate computers are 
connected to the network too. This arrangement does not 
allow, then, for frequent reconfiguration. Should seismo 
stop talking to mcvax, then people using that connection as 
part of their routing process will find their routes break. 
The second noteworthy aspect, a partial consequence of the 
first, is that within the open, pairwise connection structure 
afforded by Usenet, a backbone hierarchy of major sites 
soon arose, at first through conventional practice and later 
through explicit design. These were major sites that 
engaged in significant data transfer with each other or with 
other groups, including ihnp4 at AT&T’s Indian Hill site, 
seismo at the Center for Seismic Studies in northern 
Virginia and mcvax at the Mathematics Centrum in 
Amsterdam, which effectively became the primary trans-
Atlantic gateways, and national sites such as ukc at the 
University of Kent at Canterbury, which effectively became 
the gateway to the United Kingdom. Significantly, some of 
these also served as “well-known nodes” for routing 
purposes; one might quote one’s email address as 
“…!seismo!mcvax!itspna!jpd”, with the “…” essentially 
standing for the directive “use whatever path you use to 
regularly use to reach here.” The design of the network, 
then, is unstructured but the practice requires a commitment 
to some form of well-understood centralization. 
Uucp mail, with its explicit use of bang paths, was not the 
primary or most visible aspect of Usenet, however. A 
distributed messaging service which came to be known as 
Usenet news was first deployed in 1980, using the same 
underlying uucp mechanism to share files between sites. 
Unlike email messages directed to specific users, however, 
articles in Usenet news were open posts organized into 
topically-organized “newsgroups.” Via uucp, these would 
propagate between sites. Usenet connected many of the 
same academic and industrial research sites that came to be 
incorporated into ARPAnet or its successors, and so over 
time, internet protocols became a more effective way for 
messages to be exchanged, at which point, Usenet 
newsgroups were distributed over TCP/IP rather than uucp. 
DECnet 
Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC, or just “Digital”) 
was a leading designer and vendor of minicomputers 
through the 1970s and 1980s. Indeed, many of the 
computers connected to the early ARPAnet/Internet were 
DEC machines, especially systems in the DEC-10, DEC-20, 
PDP, and VAX ranges, which were widely used in the 
academic research community. At the same time, DEC had 
its own networking system, delivered as part of its RSX and 
VMS operating systems. This network system, known as 
DECnet or the Digital Network Architecture (DNA), was 
initially introduced in the mid-1970s as simple point-to-
point connection between two PDP-11 minicomputers. 
Subsequently, the network architecture evolved to 
incorporate new technologies and new capabilities. The 
design and development of DECnet was, then, largely 
contemporaneous with the development of the Internet 
protocols. The last fully proprietary versions were DECnet 
Phases IV and Phase IV+, in the early 1980’s [10]; DECnet 
Phases V and V+ maintained compatibility with the 
proprietary DECnet protocols but moved more in the 
direction of support for the ISO-defined OSI protocol stack. 
Given that DECnet was designed at roughly the same time 
as the Internet protocol suite, and given that it connected 
many of the same computer system types as the Internet 
protocols, it is again a useful point of comparison. DECnet 
was based on much the same “layered” protocol model that 
was the contemporary state of the art, and its basic 
architecture – a point to point connection layer, a routing 
layer, a layer for reliable sequenced delivery, and so on – is 
similar to that of systems like PUP, XNS, and TCP/IP. 
However, some key differences reveal the distinct character 
to the contexts in which DECnet was expected to operate. 
One of these is that DECnet incorporated a sophisticated 
management interface, and indeed, that facilities for 
network management were designed into the protocol stack 
from an early stage. That is, DECnet was entirely imagined 
to be deployed in a managed environment. TCP/IP has to be 
managed too, of course, but the management of TCP/IP 
networks is not a network function in itself. (The Internet 
protocol suite includes a protocol, SNMP, for network 
management uses, but network-wide, management is not a 
key consideration.) 
A second suggestive distinction lies within the sets of 
services standardized within DECnet. These included 
services, like network terminal access, similar to TCP/IP, 
but also some that the Internet protocol suite did not 
natively attempt to support, such as seamless remote 
filesystem access, in which disks attached to one computer 
would appear to be virtually available to users of other, 
connected computers. Remote file access of this sort (which 
was also a feature that had been part of the Xerox network 
system) goes beyond simply file transfer by providing users 
with the illusion of seamless access to both local and 
remote files. (Email, on the other hand, was not one of the 
standardized protocols, although networked email services 
were available through operating system applications.) 
A third – although relatively trivial – distinction was that 
DECnet addresses were just 16 bits long. Since each 
computer on a network needs to have a different address, 
the size of the address is a limit upon the size of the 
network. With 16-bit addresses, DECnet network 
implementations were limited to 64449 hosts. 
These three of these features of the DECnet design speak to 
a particular context of use. They highlight the expectation 
that DECnet deployments would be uniform, well-regulated 
and actively managed. This makes perfect sense in the 
context of DEC’s sales in corporate settings, where network 
implementation can be phased, planned, and centrally 
directed. Effective use of the shared file facilities, for 
instance, require a coordinated approach to the layout and 
conventions of filesystems across machines, while the 
network management infrastructure suggests that this was a 
key consideration in the settings for which DECnet was 
designed. An odd little implementation quirk in DECnet 
Phase IV similarly supports this. To make routing and 
discover easier, the network software running on a DECnet 
computer operating over an Ethernet network would 
actually reset the hardware network address of the computer 
to an address that conformed to the DECnet host address. 
This would cause considerable difficulty when DECnet was 
running in the same environment as other protocols, but in a 
highly managed environment where uniformity could be 
guaranteed, it was less troublesome. 
In sum, although DECnet was based on the same 
decentralized, peer-to-peer approach to network 
connectivity that characterizes the Internet protocol suite, 
its specific configuration of that approach is one that was in 
practice designed for the highly managed, highly controlled 
setting of corporate IT. 
CSNET 
The conventional historical account of the emergence of 
today’s Internet traces its beginnings to the ARPANET. 
ARPANET was both a research project and a facility; that 
is, the ARPANET project developed the networking 
technologies that are the underpinnings of the contemporary 
Internet and it also operated a facility – a network – based 
on those underpinnings. So this was not simply a research 
project funded by ARPA; it was also a facility that 
supported ARPA research. ARPA is the research arm of the 
US Department of Defense (DOD), and so in order to 
qualify as a site to be connected to ARPANET, one had to 
be a DOD site or a DOD contractor. At the time, this 
included many prominent research universities and 
computer science departments, but by no means all, and not 
even most.  
Recognizing the value that the DOD-contracting 
universities were deriving from their participation in the 
ARPANET effort, wanting to expand beyond the smaller-
scale network arrangements upon which they were already 
depending [6], and concerned that ‘the ARPANET 
experiment had produced a split between the “haves” of the 
ARPANET and the “have-nots” of the rest of the computer 
science community’ [9], a consortium of US computer 
science departments partnered with the National Science 
Foundation and other groups to put together a proposal for 
the Computer Science Research Network, or CSNET. 
CSNET integrated multiple different network technologies, 
with a store-and-forward email system over regular phone 
lines as the base level of participation, but leased line and 
X.25 networking available for higher performance 
connections. 
While the development of CSNET produced many 
important technical contributions, CSNET’s most 
significant legacies might be historical and institutional, in 
that, first, CSNET represented a significant expansion in the 
spread of TCP/IP in the academic research community, and 
second, it was designed in collaboration with and in order 
to support the mission of the National Science Foundation 
(rather than, say, the military backers of ARPA and 
ARPANET).  The CSNET effort laid the foundation for a 
later NFS-funded network called NSFNet, and it was the 
NSFNet backbone that was later opened up to commercial 
traffic, and then in 1995 replaced entirely by private service 
providers. The importance of this point is the explicit link at 
the time between institutional participation and 
connectivity, and the very idea that a network is conceived 
around an understanding of quite who and what will be 
permitted to connect. 
The more interesting technical point for us here though 
concerns the relationship between ARPANET and CSNET. 
In a minor sense, CSNET was “in competition with” 
ARPANET; it was, after all, designed as a network for 
those who were institutionally denied access to ARPANET. 
However, in all the ways that matter it was entirely 
collaborative with ARPANET; key players in the 
ARPANET project, such as TCP/IP co-designer Vint Cerf 
at Stanford, participated in the CSNET effort, and the 
networks were bridged together. The basis for that bridging 
was CSNET’s adoption of the TCP/IP protocols that had 
been designed within the ARPANET effort. Through this 
bridging, ARPANET became a subnet of CSNET. 
However, we normally think of arrangement of subnetting 
and internetworking as providing seamless interconnection, 
but the interconnection between CSNET and ARPANET 
was not quite so seamless, since they adopted different 
protocols for delivering services at the higher levels. For 
instance, the MMDF network messaging facility developed 
as part of CSNET [7] was needed to be able to bridge 
between the “phonenet” and TCP/IP components of 
CSNET, and that meant that messages destined for CSNET 
recipients would need to be routed explicitly to CSNET 
rather than simply dispatched using the usual protocols used 
on purely TCP/IP networks (such as SMTP, the standard 
Internet email transfer protocol). In other words – both 
ARPANET and CSNET implemented the Internet protocols 
(TCP/IP) but not all the other protocols of what we is 
sometimes called the “Internet protocol suite”; accordingly, 
even though they were connected together through a 
common TCP/IP infrastructure, they remained in some 
other important, user-facing senses, distinct networks, 
suggesting intriguingly that there may be more to being “an 
Internet” than running TCP/IP on interconnected networks. 
FACILITIES 
Briefly examining some of these “othernets” lets us place 
our contemporary experience of the Internet – in its 
multiple capacities as a configuration of technologies, a 
constellation of services, and an object of cultural attention 
– in context. Some of that context is a “design space” – that 
is a space of possibilities that are available as outcomes of 
specific design decisions. Some lies in “historical 
circumstance” – that is, ways that different configurations 
arose reflecting their own historical trajectories. In order to 
reflect on these in a little more detail, we can take a 
different cut at the same question – of the nature of the 
Internet within a space of alternatives – by approaching the 
it in terms of the kinds of facilities that works can offer. 
Naming 
Consider even this simple question: does a computer 
“know” its own name? In the naming arrangement of 
traditional TCP/IP, the answer is no. A computer knows its 
address but not necessarily the name by which it might be 
addressed by others, and in fact can operate in the TCP/IP 
environment quite effectively without one, as signaled by 
the fact that both TCP nor IP use addresses, not names, 
internally. So, facilities are built into the Domain Name 
Service (DNS) protocols [26] that allow a computer, on 
booting, to ask a network server, “What’s my name?” 
Naming is entirely delegated to the name service; that is, 
the network authority that answers the query “what is the 
address at which I can reach www.cnn.com?” is also the 
authority that tells a computer that it is www.cnn.com in the 
first place.  
By contrast, other networking protocols – like AppleTalk, 
for example – delegate to individual computers the right to 
assign themselves names. This can be implemented in 
different ways – by having each computer register a name 
with a naming facility, for example, or by entirely 
distributing the name lookup process rather than electing 
particular computers to implement a name or directory 
service – and these different mechanisms have their own 
differences in terms of both technological capacities and 
organizational expectations. The abilities for a computer to 
assign itself a name and to advertise that name to others are 
facilities that the designers of the IETF  “Zeroconf” 
protocol suite felt it important to add, in order to support the 
server-free “plug-and-play networking” approach of 
AppleTalk [38].  
The issue of naming raises a series of questions that 
highlight the relationship between specific technical 
facilities and the social organization of technological 
practice. Who gets to name a computer? Who is responsible 
for the names that network nodes use or call themselves? 
How is naming authority distributed? How visible are 
names? How centralized is control, and what temporalities 
shape it? Even such a simple issue as naming presents a 
microcosm of my larger argument that questions of online 
experience need to be exampled in their technical and 
historical specificities. 
Routing 
Elsewhere [12], I discuss the case of Internet routing and 
explore the history of the development of routing protocols 
as being entwined with the history of the expansion of the 
Internet infrastructure. That paper contains a fuller 
argument, with a particular focus on the materiality of 
routing, but I want to summarise from it one relevant 
element here, which is the role of so-called “autonomous 
systems” in today’s Internet routing.  
If there is one cornerstone of the argument that the Internet 
is a “decentralized” phenomenon, it is the case of network 
routing. Rather than requiring a central authority to 
understand the structure of the network and determine how 
traffic should flow, the design of the IP protocol, which gets 
Internet packets from one host to another, relies on each 
computer along a path deciding independently which way a 
piece of information should travel to take it closer to its 
destination, and creates the conditions under which 
coherent behavior results from this distributed process. 
Routing protocols are the protocols by which the 
information is distributed upon which these local decisions 
are to be made. 
Early internets relied on fairly simply protocols for 
distributing routing information. As the Internet has grown 
from a small-scale research project to an international 
utility, the complexities of routing, and of the distribution 
of routing information, have also grown, and different 
protocols have arisen to solve emerging problems. The 
major routing information protocol operative in our current 
Internet is BGP, the Border Gateway Protocol. The 
particular relevance of BGP here is that, like its predecessor 
protocol (the Exterior Gateway Protocol or EGP), BGP is 
designed not to distribute the information necessary to route 
between networks but rather to route between so-called 
“autonomous systems.” The essential consideration here is 
that corporations, network infrastructure providers, 
universities, and so on, have networks that are themselves 
both quite complicated and autonomously managed. This in 
turn leads to the idea that the unit of network routing should 
be one of these systems. This is in many ways a recognition 
of a fundamental feature of our Internet, which is that it is 
not simply a network of networks, but a network of 
institutions and semi-corporate entities, each of which wish 
to maintain control over the organization of and access to 
their own networks. The protocols by which routing 
information are passed around are protocols that reflect this 
particular arrangement, encoding and producing 
“autonomy” as much as they encode “connection.” As our 
Internet grew, the “network” was no longer an effective unit 
at which routing information could be encoded, and  
“autonomous system” arose as an alternative that reflected  
 
Figure 1. The Arpanet in 1972, exhibiting a net-like structure. 
the practical realities of the technology as it had developed; 
but in the evolutionary cycle of network protocol 
development, this meant baking those arrangements right 
into the protocol. 
Structure 
The emergence of autonomous systems as a consideration 
for routing information has an analogy in the emergence of 
structure within the interconnection arrangements of the 
network itself. 
The abstract model of interconnection that the Internet 
embodies is one of decentralized and amorphous structure. 
Indeed, the very term “network” was originally coined to 
convey not idea of computers connect together, but the 
topology of their connection as a loose and variable net-like 
mesh, in contrast to the ring, star, or hierarchical 
arrangements by which other connection fabrics had been 
designed. The basic idea of Internet-style networking is that 
computers can be connected together in whatever 
arrangement is convenient, and data units (“packets”) will 
nonetheless find their way from one point to another as long 
as some path (or route) exists from point A to point B. In a 
fixed topology, like a ring, star, or hierarchy, the path from 
one node to another is fixed and pre-defined. The key 
insight of the packet-switching design of the Internet is that 
there need be no prior definition of the route from one place 
to another; packets could find their own way, adaptively 
responding to the dynamics of network topology and traffic 
patterns. Amorphous topology is arguably one of the key 
characteristics of internet-style technologies. 
Early network diagrams from the days of ARPAnet, the 
predecessor to the Internet, do indeed display this net-work 
character (figure 1). Over time, though, more hierarchical 
arrangements have arisen. These hierarchical patterns arise 
not least from two sources – geography and economics. The 
geographical considerations produce a distinction between 
metropolitan and long-haul networks, where metropolitan 
networks support relatively dense connectivity within small 
regions (for instance, the homes and businesses connected 
to the network in a town or neighborhood), while long-haul 
networks provide high-speed and high-capacity connections 
between urban regions [24]. The different demands upon 
these different kinds of connection are best met with 
different technologies. This is where the economic 
considerations also come into play. Ever since the 
decommissioning of the NSFNet backbone in 1995 and the 
emergence of the commercial Internet, Internet service 
provision has been largely in the hands of commercial 
operators. To function as a competitive marketplace, 
network provision must involve multiple competing 
providers, each of whom in turn specialize in different 
aspects of service provision. One result of this 
specialization is a hierarchical segmentation of network 
service provision. 
Broadly, we can distinguish four different commercial 
entities – and hence four different forms of service 
provision and four different technological arrangements – 
in contemporary Internet service. The four are content 
providers, content distribution networks (CDNs), internet 
service providers (ISPs), and transit carriers. 
Content providers are corporations like Netflix, Amazon, 
Apple, or others whose business comprises (in whole or in 
part) delivering digital material to subscribers and 
consumers. Internet Service Providers, by and large, sell 
internet services to end-users, either individual subscribers 
or businesses.  We think of our ISPs as delivering the 
content to us, but in truth they are generally responsible 
only for the last steps in the network, in our local cities or 
neighborhoods. Transit carriers are responsible for getting 
data from content providers to the ISPs. While the names of 
ISPs like Verizon and Comcast are well known, the names 
of transit carriers – such as Level 3, Cogent, or XO – are 
much less familiar, despite the central role that they play in 
bringing information to any of our devices. Content 
providers will typically contract directly with transit 
carriers for their content delivery needs. Transit carriers and 
ISPs connect their networks through a set of technical and 
economic arrangements collectively known as “peering” (as 
in the connection between two “peer” networks). 
Peering arrangements are almost always bilateral, i.e. an 
agreement between two parties. They are generally 
bidirectional and often cost-free, although they may have 
traffic or bandwidth limits beyond which charges are 
levied. The term “peer” is a hold-over from the military and 
non-profit days preceding the development of the 
commercial Internet, and speaks directly to the notion of 
“inter-networking” (ie, connecting together different 
networks and transmitting traffic between them). The 
“peers” that are now linked by peering arrangements, 
though, are not peer academic or research networks but 
commercial entities engaging in economic relations. These 
arrangements are largely hidden from the view of end users, 
but become broadly visible when disputes arise around the 
adequacy of peering relationships, corporate responsiveness 
to changing conditions upon them, or the responsibilities of 
carriage associated with them. For example, recent (early 
2014) debates around Internet streaming movie provider 
Netflix paying ISP Comcast for access to its facilities and 
networks have largely ignored the fact that the problem to 
which Netflix was responding was a breakdown in relations 
between Comcast and Cogent, one of the transit carriers 
that Netflix pays to transmit its traffic to ISPs [32]. A 
dispute arose between Comcast and Cogent concerning 
whose responsibility it was to address bandwidth 
limitations when Cogent began to send more traffic onto 
Comcast’s network than their peering agreement allowed. 
In the face of this ongoing dispute, Netflix arranged to 
locate its servers with direct access to Comcast’s subscriber 
network, eliminating their dependence upon Comcast’s 
transit network. While this raised the specter in the popular 
press and in technical circles of an end-run around “net 
neutrality” arguments, the source of the problem in a 
dispute between carriers – and in particular at the boundary 
between an ISP and a transit carrier – is in some ways more 
interesting. 
While the inspiration for the design of the internet protocols 
was to allow the creation of a network of networks, the 
emergent structure is one in which not all networks are 
equal. It’s not surprise that networks of course come in 
different sizes and different speeds, but the structure of 
contemporary networking relies upon a particular structural 
arrangement of networks and different levels of network 
providers, which in turn is embodied in a series of 
commercial and institutional arrangements (such as 
“settlement-free peering” [23]. As in other cases what we 
see at work here is an evolutionary convergence in which 
the network, as an entity that continues to grow and adapt 
(both through new technologies becoming available and 
new protocols being designed) does so in ways that 
incorporate and subsequently come to reinforce historical 
patterns of institutional arrangements. 
End-to-End 
Gillespie [17] has discussed the importance of the so-called 
“end-to-end principle” [33] in not just the design of the 
Internet platform but also in the debates about the 
appropriate function of a network. The end-to-end principle 
essentially states that all knowledge about the specific 
needs of particular applications should be concentrated at 
the “end-points” of a network connection, that is, at the 
hosts that are communicating with each other; no other 
network components, such as routers, should need to know 
any of the details of application function or data structure in 
order to operate effectively. This implies too that correctly 
routing a packet should not require routers to inspect the 
packet contents or transform the packet in any way. So, for 
instance, if data is to be transmitted in an encrypted form, 
the intermediate nodes do not need to understand the nature 
of the encryption in order to transmit the packets. There is a 
trade-off in this of course; on the one hand, the network can 
be simpler, because every packet will be treated identically, 
but on the other, distinctions that we might want to make, 
such as between real-time and non-real-time traffic are 
unavailable to the network. 
The end-to-end principle was originally formulated as a 
simple design principle, but it had, as Gillespie notes, many 
consequences that are organizational and political as well as 
technical. For instance, the separation between application 
semantics and packet transit also essentially creates the 
opportunity for a separation between application service 
providers (e.g. Netflix or Facebook) and infrastructure 
providers (e.g. ISPs like Time Warner or Verizon) by 
ensuring that applications and infrastructure can evolve 
independently. Arguably, these aspects of the Internet’s 
design have been crucial to its successful evolution. 
However, the end-to-end principle is under assault as a 
practical rubric for design. Two examples of obstacles to 
the end-to-end principle are the rise of middleboxes and 
assaults on net neutrality. 
Middleboxes is a generic term for devices that intervene in 
network connections. Unlike routers, which, designed 
according to the end-to-end principle, never examine packet 
internals or transform transmitted data, middleboxes may 
do both of these. Perhaps the most common middleboxes 
are gateways that perform Network Address Translation or 
NAT. Almost every residential network gateway or WiFi 
base station is actually a NAT device. NAT is a mechanism 
that partially resolves the problem of scarce network 
addresses. Most people buy a residential internet service 
that provides them with just a single network address, even 
though they have multiple devices using the service (e.g. a 
laptop and a smartphone). Network Address Translation 
allows both of these devices to use a single network address 
simultaneously. To the outside world, the laptop and the 
smartphone appear like a single device that is making 
multiple simultaneous connections; the NAT device keeps 
track of which connection are associated with which device 
and delivers responses appropriately. NAT violates the end-
to-end principle, however, with various consequences. For 
exactly, because the individual devices are not technically 
end-points on the public internet, one cannot make a 
connection to them directly. Further, network flow control 
algorithms may be confused by the presence of multiple 
devices with essentially the same network address. Further, 
NAT gateways achieve their effects by rewriting packet 
addresses before the packets have been delivered to their 
end-point. 
A second assault on the end-to-end principle is the 
emergence of threats to network neutrality. Net neutrality is 
a term to express the idea that network traffic should be 
treated identically no matter what it contains, and no matter 
where it originates or terminates. However, many 
organizational entities have reasons to want to violate this 
principle. For instance, a network provider which is owned 
by a media company might want to prioritize the delivery of 
its own media traffic to its customers, giving it a higher 
priority than other traffic to ensure a smoother service, or 
an ISP might want to limit the bandwidth available to high-
traffic users in order to encourage more equitable access to 
the network. These kinds of situations often involve 
deploying technologies like so-called “deep packet 
inspection” (mechanisms that examine not just the headers 
of a packet but its contents in order to decide how it should 
be treated) that violate the end-to-end principle. 
As discussions such as those of Saltzer et al. [33] make 
clear, the end-to-end principle was a foundational and 
significant principle in the design of the Internet, 
representing not just a specific technical consideration but 
also a commitment to an evolutionary path for network 
service provision. There is no question then that the Internet 
was designed around this principle. However, as the rise of 
middleboxes and challenges to network neutrality make 
clear, that doesn’t imply that the end-to-end principle is a 
design feature of our (contemporary) Internet. More 
generally, this case illustrates that technical design 
principles are themselves subject to revision, 
reinterpretation and revocation as the technology is 
implemented and evolves (c.f. [28]). 
THE FEUDAL INTERNET 
The emergent structure of our Internet – the market niches 
of transit carrier and ISP, the practical solution of CDNs, 
the fragmentation produced by middleboxes, the 
relationship between mobile carriers, telecommunications 
firms, and media content producers, and so on – draws 
attention to a simple but important truth of internetworking: 
the Internet comprises a lot of wires, and every one of them 
is owned by someone. To the extent that those owners are 
capitalist enterprises competing in a marketplace, then the 
obvious corollary is that, since all the wires can do is carry 
traffic from one point to another, the carriage of traffic must 
become profit-generating. The mechanisms by which traffic 
carriage over network connections becomes profitable is 
basically either through a volume-based or per-byte 
mechanism – a toll for traffic – or through a contractual 
arrangement that places the facilities of one entity’s 
network at the temporary disposal of another – a rental 
arrangement. This system of rents and tolls provides the 
basic mechanism by which different autonomous systems, 
each of which provisions its own services, manages its own 
infrastructures, and then engages in a series of agreements 
of mutual aid. 
If this system seems familiar, it is not so much that it 
encapsulates contemporary market capitalism but more that 
it is essentially feudal in its configuration. Marx argued for 
feudalism and capitalism as distinct historical periods with 
their links to material means of production – “The hand-
mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill 
society with the industrial capitalist” [25]. Recent writers, 
though, have used the term “neofeudal” to describe the 
situation in late capitalism in which aspects of public life 
increasingly become private, gated domains – everything 
from toll lanes on the freeway and executive lounges at the 
airport, on the small end, to gated communities and 
tradeable rights to pollute the environment issued to large 
corporations at the other (e.g. [34]). The essential 
consideration here is the erasure of public infrastructure and 
the erection of a system of tariffs, tolls, and rents that 
govern the way we navigate a world made up of privatized 
but encompassing domains, within which market relations 
do not dominate.  
Beyond the general use of the term “neofeudal” to refer to 
the privatization of public goods, let me take the metaphor 
of the feudal Internet more seriously for a moment to point 
to a couple of significant considerations. 
The first is that operating mechanism of feudalism is not the 
market transaction but rather long-standing commitments of 
fealty, vassalage, and protection. These are not the 
instantaneous mutual engagements of market capitalism but 
temporally extended (indeed, indefinite) arrangements with 
little or nothing by way of choice or options. Indeed, the 
constraints upon feudal relations are geographical as much 
as anything else: infrastructural, if you will. One can see, 
arguably, some similarities to the way that geographical and 
infrastructural constraints lead to a pattern of relations 
between internet providers that also relies upon long-term, 
“residence”-based, partnerships. The ties that bind 
individuals to their service providers in semi-monopolistic 
conditions of the US broadband market, or perhaps even 
more pointedly, the links that connect large-scale data 
service providers such as Netflix with transit carriers like 
Level 3 are not simply conveniently structured as long-term 
arrangements, but rather can only operate that way because 
of the infrastructure commitments involved (such as the 
physical siting of data stores and server farms.) Similarly, 
the need for physical interconnection between different 
networks makes high-provider-density interconnection 
nodes like One Wilshire in downtown Los Angeles (see, 
e.g., [12, 40]) into “obligatory passage points” in Callon’s 
language [5] – that is, to get interconnection between 
networks, you need to be where all the other networks are, 
and they all need to be there too. For all that we typically 
talk about the digital domain as fast-paced and ever-
changing, these kinds of arrangements – not simply 
commitments to infrastructure but commitments to the 
institutions relationships that infrastructure conditions – are 
not ones that can change quickly, easily, or cheaply. These 
relations are more feudal that mercantile. 
The second interesting point that a feudal approach draws 
attention to is the persistence of pre-existing institutional 
structures – perhaps most obviously, the nation-state. 
Although John Perry Barlow’s [2] classic “Declaration of 
the Independence of Cyberspace” famously argues that the 
“governments of the industrial world… [have] no 
sovereignty” in the realm of the digital, and 
notwithstanding the IETF’s famous motto that “rejects 
kings [and] presidents” in favor of “rough consensus and 
running code” [20], the truth is that governments and 
presidents continue to manifest themselves quite 
significantly in not just the governance but the fabric of our 
Internet. National and regional concerns arise in a variety of 
ways – in the provision of specific linguistic content [36], 
in the regional caching of digital content, in the question of 
international distribution rights for digital content (e.g. 
which movies can be viewed online in which countries), in 
assertions of national sovereignty over information about 
citizens (e.g. Vladimir Putin’s public musings that data 
about Russian citizens should be stored only on servers in 
Russia [22]), in the different regimes that govern 
information access (e.g. the 2014 EU directive known 
popularly as the “right to be forgotten”), and in local 
debates about Internet censorship (from China’s “Great 
Firewall” and Singapore’s self-censorship regime to 
discussions of nationwide internet filters in Australia and 
the UK). The very fact that a thriving business opportunity 
exists for commercial Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
services that allow users to get online “as if” they were 
located in a different country signals the persistent 
significance of nation-states and national boundaries in the 
experience of our Internet. Similarly, significant debate has 
surrounded the role of national interests in Internet 
governance [e.g. 27], and the International Tele-
communications Union or ITU – a United Nations 
organization whose “members” are not technical experts or 
corporations but nation-states – remains a significant body 
in the development of network technologies and policy. Just 
as feudalism reinforced and made all aspects of everyday 
life subject to the boundaries of the manor, the shire, and 
the nation, so too does our Internet – not necessarily any 
Internet, but certainly our Internet – retain a significant 
commitment to the relevance of similar geographical, 
national, and institutional boundaries. 
The third point to be emphasized here is the way that these 
are simultaneously social and technical arrangements – not 
social arrangements that give rise to technological designs, 
nor technological designs that provoke social responses. 
Middleboxes, deep packet inspection, and the autonomous 
systems of BGP should be regarded as, and analyzed as, 
both at once. This requires, then, a view that both takes 
specific technological configurations (rather than principles, 
imaginaries, and metaphors) seriously as objects of analytic 
attention, and that identifies and examines the social, 
political, and economic contexts within which these come 
to operate. To the extent that a feudal regime of hierarchical 
relations based on long-term structures of mutual 
commitment can be invoked as an account of our Internet, it 
can be done only within with context of a sociotechnical 
analysis that is both historically specific and symmetric. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The larger project of which the current exploration forms a 
part is an attempt to take seriously the materialities of 
information and their consequences. It is critical to this 
project that we move beyond accounts simply of 
information infrastructure, but also recognize the relevant 
materialities of representation, and their consequences [11, 
13]. As Powell [31] has argued in her study of open 
hardware projects, patterns of historical evolution torque 
the design principles that often provide not only technical 
arrangements but also the social imaginaries that are 
mobilized in our discussions of technology. To bring this 
perspective to contemporary networking, then, means not 
simply that we need to think about the pragmatics of 
undersea cables [37], satellite downlinks [29], and server 
farms [40], but also the way that specific representations of 
action and encodings of data are designed to be 
manipulated, transmitted, and moved in particular sorts of 
ways, with consequences for the resultant experience of the 
network as offering particular opportunities for individual 
and collective action. 
In other words, the primary concern is to see networked 
arrangements as historically particular crystallizations of 
not just technical but also institutional, economic, and 
political potentialities. To do this, particularly with respect 
to the technology that we rather glibly call “the Internet,” I 
have suggested that two moves are needed. 
The first move is from the idea of “the Internet” to that of 
“an Internet” – that is, to re-encounter our contemporary 
network as not the only possible Internet that could have 
been built, but as one of a range of possible networks. 
When we consider a number of possible networks, we start 
to pay attention to the range of expectations, institutional 
arrangements, policies, technical configurations, and other 
dimensions that might characterize the space of potentials.  
The second move is from “an Internet” to “this Internet” – 
that is, to narrow down once more and so grapple with the 
historical, geographical, political and social specificities 
that constrain and condition the particular network with 
which we are engaged at any particular moment in time. 
This Internet is not the one that was conceived of by those 
like Paul Baran or Donald Davies, designed by those like 
Vint Cerf or Bob Taylor, or opened to commercial 
operation by the NSF – it has elements of each of those, but 
it is a historically specific construction which has 
encompassed, transformed, extended, and redirected any of 
those particular networks. This Internet is something that 
we can grapple with empirically. We are not in much of a 
position to make general statements about “the Internet”; 
but when we ask questions about “this Internet,” we may 
have a starting point for investigation.  
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